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Abstract: This paper reports the results of the first experiment in the United States designed
to distinguish two sources of ambiguity: imprecise ambiguity (expert groups agree on a range
of probability, but not on any point estimate) versus conflict ambiguity (each expert group
provides precise probability estimates which differ from one group to another). The specific
context is whether risk professionals (here, insurers) behave differently under risk and
different types of ambiguity when pricing catastrophic risks (floods and hurricanes) and noncatastrophic risks (home fires). The data show that insurers charge higher premiums when
faced with ambiguity than when the probability of a loss is well specified (risk). Furthermore,
they tend to charge more for conflict ambiguity than imprecise ambiguity for flood and
hurricane hazards, but less in the case of fire. The source of ambiguity also impacts causal
inferences insurers make to reduce their uncertainty.
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Introduction
Since Ellsberg (1961), there have been important research developments in the
economic and decision sciences literature on the impact that ambiguity — that is, uncertainty
about probability – can have on how individuals make their decisions (Camerer and Weber
1992). Recent papers demonstrate a growing interest in better understanding how ambiguity
affects choices in the experimental literature on decision-making (Viscusi and Magat 1992;
Du and Budescu 2005; Hey et al. 2010; Rubaltelli et al. 2010), the formal decision science
literature (Abdellaoui et al. 2010; Gajdos et al. 2008; Ghirardato and Marinacci 2002;
Klibanoff et al. 2005; Machina 2009; Mukerji, 2003; Neilson 2010; Seo 2009; Snow 2010),
and neuro-economics (Chew et al. 2008; Levy et al. 2010).
This research reveals that attitudes to ambiguity are more complex than originally
conjectured by Ellsberg (1961) and that the domain of outcomes (loss or gain) and the level
of probability influence individuals’ choices under ambiguity (Camerer and Weber 1992;
Hogarth and Einhorn 1990; Viscusi and Chesson 1999). In the domain of insurance on which
this paper focuses, previous surveys of underwriters and actuaries indicate that insurers are
ambiguity-averse for low-probability, high-consequence negative events. In other words,
they will want to charge higher premiums when there is ambiguity than when the
probabilities and losses are well-specified (Kunreuther et al. 1995; Cabantous 2007).
What is less known, however, is whether the nature of the ambiguity also matters.
Research on decision-making under uncertainty has recently opened this “black box” to study
the impact of various sources of uncertainty on choices. For instance, several empirical
papers have focused on the impact of a specific type of ambiguity, namely disagreement or
conflict among experts (Baillon et al. 2010; Budescu et al. 2003; Cabantous 2007; Cameron
2005; Dean and Shepherd 2007; Smithson 1999; Viscusi 1997; Viscusi and Chesson 1999).
This research reveals that when seeking advice from multiple advisors, individuals are
2

sensitive to whether these experts agree or disagree with each other with respect to a specific
forecast and/or in their recommendations for actions.3
This paper builds on this emerging literature to investigate the effect of the two
different contexts of ambiguity on insurance pricing decisions by sophisticated agents
(insurers): imprecise (but consensual) ambiguity and conflict ambiguity. To illustrate these
two conditions, assume that two advisors, A1 and A2, are asked to provide estimates about the
probability of a given scenario, for instance a Category 3 hurricane hitting the city of New
Orleans again in the next 50 years. Under a risk situation, they both agree that the probability
is, say, 1/2 so there is consensus on a precise probability. Formally, negative risky prospects
with two outcomes yield outcome x with probability p and outcome y (with 0≥y≥x) with
probability (1−p).
Now let us discuss the following two contexts of ambiguity. The first one occurs
when the two advisors A1 and A2 end up with a probability interval rather than a precise
estimate. Furthermore, their two intervals are identical. For instance, they both think the
probability interval is [1/4; 3/4]. This is a case of consensus but where there is an imprecise
estimate. We call such a situation imprecise ambiguity. Formally, imprecise ambiguity
prospects give x with a probability that belongs to the interval [p−r, p+r] with r ≤ p ≤ 1−r.
and y (with 0≥y≥x) otherwise. Conflict ambiguity occurs when both advisors A1 and A2
provide a precise point estimate but the two probabilities differ from each other (this could
also be two different ranges of probabilities, but we will not discuss this case in this paper).
For instance, A1 strongly believes that the hurricane will occur with probability 1/4 and A2
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Formal models of aggregation of beliefs with conflicting probability estimates are proposed in Cres et al.

(2010); Gajdos and Vergnaud (2009); Gollier (2007).
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strongly believes it will happen with a probability 3/4.4 Formally, conflict ambiguity
prospects give x with a probability of either (p−r) or (p+r) and y (with 0≥y≥x) otherwise (r is
fixed and strictly positive).
Table 1 summarizes these three cases for the above example.
-----------------------------------------------------INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
-----------------------------------------------------In this paper, we compare insurance pricing in these three contexts in which
information structure differs. Our focus is on professional insurers confronted with events
that have low probabilities but which can generate catastrophic losses if they occur. We
study decision contexts where actuaries and underwriters in insurance companies seek advice
and request probability forecasts from different groups of experts. Are insurance prices that
insurers would like to charge different under these three contexts? Is imprecise knowledge
better than conflicting expertise in that insurers will ask a lower price for the former than they
would for the latter?
We are also interested in the effect of these two sources of ambiguity on cognition.
To understand how cognition impacts attitudes towards ambiguous risks and actual choices
we use insights from attribution theory (Hilton and Slugoski 1986; Hilton et al. 1995).
Although several authors have highlighted the role of attributional explanations in attitudes
toward ambiguity (Einhorn and Hogarth 1985; Heath and Tversky 1991; Taylor 1995), to our
knowledge no study has explored how causal attribution for analysts’ expressions of
uncertainty (consensual or conflicting) is utilized by expert insurers to make decisions.

4

See Cabantous (2007), Gajdos and Vergnaud (2009), Smithson (1999) for further discussion on these three

contexts. Our example is such that the risk situation (probability1/2) is the mean of the interval boundaries (1/4
and 3/4) but this does not have to be.
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Our experiment shows that risk professionals (here, insurers) behave differently when
the probability of the loss is well specified (risk), versus under different types of ambiguity.
Specifically, we find that insurers charge higher premiums when faced with ambiguity than
when faced with risk. Across three hazards (floods, hurricanes, house fires), we find that on
average, insurers report that for ambiguous damages, they would charge premiums for a oneyear contract that are between 25 percent and 30 percent higher than the premiums they
would charge for risky damages. Furthermore, they would likely charge more for conflict
ambiguity than imprecise ambiguity for flood and hurricane hazards (8.5 percent and 13.9
percent more for a one-year contract, respectively), but less so in the case of fire (8.3 percent
less for a one-year contract), probably because they see much less ambiguity in probabilities
concerning typical house fires. Normally, they have considerable data on this risk so the
probability is well-specified. We also find that the type of ambiguity impacts on the nature of
the causal inferences insurers make to reduce their uncertainty.

1. Predictions and literature review
In this section we specify a set of hypotheses (H) and provide support for each of them by
reviewing the relevant literature.
1.1. Insurers are ambiguity-averse for low-probability, high-consequence events (H1)
If insurers are averse to ambiguity with respect to low-probability, high-consequence
events whose occurrence is external to the insurers’ actions, they will want to charge higher
premiums when there is uncertainty about the probability of a loss than when the probability
is well-specified. This prediction is consistent with past studies on ambiguity avoidance
(Camerer and Weber 1992; Hogarth and Einhorn 1990; Viscusi and Chesson 1999), including
studies of how insurance underwriters and actuaries make decisions about the price they will
charge for providing insurance coverage. Kunreuther et al. (1995) show that underwriters
5

report they would charge higher premiums to insure against damages with ambiguous
probabilities than for damages with precisely-known probabilities (see also Hogarth and
Kunreuther 1989; Cabantous 2007).
An explanation for this ambiguity aversion is that individuals avoid situations where
they do not have information they think others might have (Frisch and Baron 1988). In a
similar vein, Heath and Tversky (1991) show that ambiguity avoidance comes from a
“feeling of incompetence” when decision makers perceived that they have insufficient
knowledge about a specific event. Below, we use models of attribution to explore the kinds
of inferences insurers make by proposing an extension and test of Smithson’s (1999)
cognitive explanation of conflict aversion. Attribution theory has been applied to
understanding how people cope with uncertainty (e.g., McClure et al. 2001) but few studies
have used it to understand people’s attitudes to ambiguity. Heath and Tversky (1991) and
Taylor (1995), for example, link ambiguity aversion to attributions of credit and blame, but
they do not study the causal attributions individuals make when they face uncertain events.

1.2.Insurers prefer imprecise ambiguity over conflict ambiguity (H2)
Our second hypothesis is that insurers will want to charge a higher premium under
conflict ambiguity than under imprecise ambiguity. Smithson (1999) shows that the
preference for imprecise ambiguity over conflict ambiguity comes from a cognitive heuristic
that leads decision makers to think that conflicting advisors are less credible and trustworthy
than consensual (yet imprecise) advisors. This prediction is also consistent with Cabantous
(2007) that studies conflict aversion of French actuaries. One of the reasons that insurers
would prefer imprecise ambiguity over situations of conflict ambiguity is that conflict is
likely to be seen as an indicator of lack of competence on the part of at least one of the
advisors. This leads us to want to test two other hypotheses, H3 and H4.

6

1.3. Insurers normally expect convergent and precise estimates from their advisors (H3)
Attribution theory has shown that people often make causal inferences by contrasting
the current situation to their “world knowledge about the normal state of affairs holding in the
world” (Hilton and Slugoski 1986). This means that individuals are more likely to engage in
attributional thinking when a situation departs from what they expected to face (Weiner
1985). We expect that professional insurers are used to the standard case where relevant
actuarial data exists on the event they cover and that two expert advisors would most likely
agree on a point prediction. This is known as the “experts-should-converge” hypothesis
(Shanteau 2001). Consequently, they will find both kinds of ambiguity in predictions less
normal than the standard risk case of perfect convergence of precise estimates.

1.4. Insurers will attribute conflicting estimates to less credible and trustworthy advisors
(internal factors) but consensual imprecision to task difficulty (external factors) (H4).
In the framework of classic attribution theory, an event is said to be “explained” when
individuals have identified a characteristic of some involved person (internal factor), situation
or occasion (external factors) which has produced it (Kelley 1973). Attributing an event to
some person, situation or occasion factors depends on the configuration of consensus,
distinctiveness and consistency information available (see Hilton 2007 for a review).
Applying standard attributional logic to the case of insurance professionals results in
the following predictions. First, in the case of conflicting advice from experts, the low
consensus between experts will prompt the attributional inference that at least one of the
advisors is wrong and is thus perceived as being “incompetent” (Hilton et al. 1995). This is
precisely the basis for testing the first prediction of hypothesis H4, which states that under the
conflict ambiguity case, the responders will attribute the conflicting forecasts to the
incompetence of (at least one of) their advisors as compared to the standard risk case where
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the experts’ point predictions converge. The second prediction of H4 is that in the case of
imprecise ambiguity, compared to the standard risk case, insurers are more likely to attribute
the ambiguity not to incompetence, but to an external effect such as the difficulty of the
judgmental task. This is because the high consensus between expert advisors implies that
insurers, who receive imprecise but consensual forecasts, are more likely to identify
something unusual about the task in question, such as the inherent difficulty of modeling
catastrophe risks for which reliable large-scale actuarial data might not exist.

2. An experiment studying U.S. underwriters and actuaries’ behavior under risk,
imprecise ambiguity, and conflict ambiguity
We tested these predictions in an experiment using a non-standard participant pool (insurers
who are experts in decision-making under uncertainty) with a field context (insurance pricing
task) involving three hazards (flood, hurricane, fire). Specifically, we created a web-based
questionnaire asking insurers what premiums they would charge a representative client under
different situations of uncertainty (namely risk, imprecise ambiguity and conflict ambiguity)
and their causal understanding of the situation (i.e., reasons why the probability is not well
specified by the experts they have turned to for advice).

2.1. Stimulus
The three different kinds of hazards were crossed with three sources of uncertainty:
risk, imprecise ambiguity and conflict ambiguity, leading to nine possible scenarios. The
responders were given probability estimates from two different risk modeling companies
(“advisors” hereafter) to estimate the probability of each one of these three hazards.
As discussed in the introduction, in the case of risk, both advisors agreed on the same
probability. In the imprecise ambiguity case, neither of the advisors provided a precise
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probability estimate but both converged on the exact same range of probabilities. In the
conflict ambiguity case, each advisor provided a point estimate of the probability of the predefined damage and amount of insurance claims, but the two likelihood estimates were
different. Table 2 depicts the scenarios utilized in the experiment.
-----------------------------------------------------INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
------------------------------------------------------

These scenarios are similar to the ones used in previous studies on insurers’ attitudes
to ambiguity (Cabantous 2007; De Marcellis 2000; Kunreuther et al. 1995). All the insurers
who participated in the experiment were asked to imagine that they were employed by an
insurance company that “provides coverage to 1,000 homeowners in an area that has the
possibility of [flood/hurricane/fire] damage.” They were also told that “The value of each
home in this area is $200,000. If a [flood/hurricane/fire] occurs and severely damages a
home it will cause $100,000 in insurance claims (above the deductible).” (It is therefore
known that the amount of the payment the insurance company will have to make if the event
occurs is $100,000 per house). In the case of flood damage, which is provided in the United
States mainly by the government-run National Flood Insurance Program, we also told the
insurers to “Imagine that the current federal National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) no
longer exists and that flood insurance is offered to homeowners in the private market.”5 In
this context, their company would also be paying for losses associated with the flood
scenario.
Insurers who participated in the survey were asked to base their estimates of the
probability of damage on the figures provided by their advisors, the two modeling firms with

5

See Michel-Kerjan (2010) for an analysis of the operation of this program.
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whom they usually work.6 The probability of damage was set at 1 percent in the risky case,
and the range between 0.5 percent and 2 percent in the imprecise ambiguity case. The
probability estimate in the risky context was thus the geometrical mean of the two bounds of
the probability range. In the conflict ambiguity case, one risk-modeling firm estimated that
the probability of the damage was 0.5 percent whereas the other estimated it was 2 percent.7
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the three cases.
-----------------------------------------------------INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
------------------------------------------------------

2.2. Experiment questions
As we were interested in pricing behavior (see H1 and H2), we asked participants to
provide the “pure premiums” they would charge. These pure premiums exclude the other
costs the insurance company would incur and want to pass on to its policyholders, such as
administrative and marketing costs, loss assessment costs and the opportunity cost associated
with capital that insurers need to hold to satisfy rating agencies’ and regulatory solvency
requirements. Insurers were asked to indicate the minimum pure premium they would charge
to provide a 1-year full insurance coverage contract against the specific untoward event, and
the annual premium for a 20-year full insurance coverage contract.

6

We could have used two qualitatively different advisors, like a risk modeling firm and the internal technical

team of the insurance company.

However, because the study focuses on situations where no a priori

information about the reliability of the advisors is available, we used two similar advisors. If we had introduced
a risk modeling firm and an internal team of experts, the participants would have been less likely to consider
that the two sources of information were a priori equally reliable.
7

The geometric mean in this case is (0.5x2)½ = 1%. In section 3 we compare the premiums that insurers would

charge with actuarially-priced insurance under arithmetic mean of the probability interval (1.25%); where equal
weight is given to the two estimates (conflict) and the interval frontiers (imprecise).
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We were interested in how these insurers would react to a multi-year contract because
there have been recent proposals to modify insurance contracts in that direction so as to
provide more stability to the policyholders over time and reduce administrative cost for the
insurer.8 Here, multi-year insurance keeps the annual insurance premium the same over a
fixed time horizon. To test hypothesis H3 we included a question about insurers’ perceptions
of the degree of “unusualness” of the probability estimates that they were given (see question
2 in appendix 1).
To test hypothesis H4, two causal attributions were linked to the advisors (person
causal attribution) and one to the task performed by the advisors (situation causal attribution).
One question on causal attribution was positive (“Both modeling firms did their work very
well.”; see question 3 in appendix 1) and another was negative, implying incompetence (“At
least one of the modeling firms did not do its work very well.”; see question 4 in appendix 1).
Another question also concerned the perception of the competence of the advisors (question
6: “To what extent do you have the impression that the two modeling firms are both
competent in estimating the probability of the [flood/hurricane/fire] damage in this case?).
Question 5 concerned the difficulty of the task: “How strongly do you agree with the
following statement?: “Estimating the probability of the [flood/hurricane/fire] damage in this
case is a highly difficult task.”
After the participants had read the three scenarios and completed the series of
questions, we asked several socio-demographic questions (sex, age, training, and experience)
and queried about the insurance company they worked for (number of employees,
surplus/capital and type of the company). Appendix 1 provides the full list of questions from

8

For more details on the structure of a multi-year policy see Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009), Jaffee,

Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2011).
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the web-based questionnaire, and appendix 2 provides socio-demographics of participants
and their company.

2.3. Sampling plan
To reduce the number of scenarios given to each participant, we used a Latin-square
design and participants were randomly assigned to three of the nine scenarios. The computer
program ensured that each participant was exposed to only one hazard (flood, hurricane or
fire) that was associated with only one source of uncertainty (risk, conflict ambiguity or
imprecise ambiguity). For example a participant could be exposed to “Fire damage in the
conflict ambiguity context,” “Flood damage in the imprecise ambiguity context” and
“Hurricane damage in the risky context.” The order of presentation of the scenarios was
randomized.

2.4. Insurers participating in the study
The survey was available online on a dedicated website and required a password.
Participants in a pilot study reported that the instrument was user-friendly and that the survey
did not take them more than fifteen minutes to complete.9
All the responders were from insurance companies operating in the United States.
Nearly two-thirds of them were actuaries and the rest either underwriters, risk managers, or at
other management positions. The computer treatment of the data assured the anonymity of
the answers. We obtained 84 responses, four of which were eliminated because the
individuals did not fully complete the questionnaire. The number of responses is consistent

9

Two insurance trade associations announced the existence of this survey to their members. Because of the way

it was made available to all their members without being sent individually to each one of them, it is difficult to
determine the response rate.
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with other studies.10 Of the 80 participants, 58 (72.5%) were males and 22 (22.5%) females.
The majority of participants were in their 20s and 30s (27.5% and 35% respectively); onefourth were in their 40s (23.75%) and 13.75% in their 50s. A majority of answers came from
publicly-traded insurers (56.25%) and mutual insurance companies (33.75%). More than half
of the participants were working for large companies, those with a policyholders’ surplus in
the $5 billion and $10 billion range and with a number of employees ranging from 5,000 to
20,000 (see appendix 2 for more details).

3. Results and Discussion
Table 3a below reports the geometric means11 and median values of pure premiums
for the main experimental conditions. Mean and median pure premiums are always higher
for all three hazards than the expected loss of $1,000 (i.e. 1% annual chance of losing
$100,000). This is consistent with findings from previous studies that show that insurers are
risk averse.
-----------------------------------------------------INSERT TABLE 3a ABOUT HERE
-----------------------------------------------------10

For example, Ho et al. (2005) report the results of a series of experiments conducted with a total of 92

participants (30 managers in Experiment 1, and 62 participants in Experiment 2). In another paper published in
2002, the same authors ran an experiment with a total of 79 MBA students (39 MBA students in Experiment 1,
and 40 MBA students in Experiment 2).
11

Descriptive statistics revealed that the premium distributions violated the normality assumption (skewness

coefficient = 2.98 and 6.82 for the 1-year contract and the 20-year contract respectively). We therefore
performed a log transformation (skewness coefficient = 0.53 and 0.76 for the log(1yP) and log(20yP)
respectively). Such a procedure allows counteracting the effect of outliers and is useful when the distribution of
the dependent variable is highly skewed (see Kunreuther et al. 1995 for a similar analysis). In the subsequent
analysis, we use the log (Premium/EL) as our main dependent variable.
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3.1. Ambiguity aversion hypothesis (H1)
To test H1, we compared the premiums under risk with those under both types of
ambiguity. Table 3a shows that, on average across natural hazards, the mean premiums for
one year contracts for imprecise ambiguouity are 25 percent higher than the mean premiums
for risky damages; they are 30 percent higher for conflict ambiguity than for risky damages.12
(Median premiums for ambiguous damages under one year contracts ranged from 50 percent
to 92.5 percent higher than for risky damages). This suggests that insurers are averse to both
types of ambiguity.
To formally test this ambiguity aversion we undertook a Multivariate Analysis of
Variance (MANOVA) on the log premiums charged for the 1-year and the 20-year contracts,
and determined the main effects of each of three fixed factors: Source of Uncertainty, Natural
Hazard and Participant ID.13 We found that the premiums under imprecise ambiguity are
significantly higher than premiums under risk (F=14.62, p=0.000 and F=10.74, p=0.002 for
1-year contracts and 20-year contracts respectively). In other words, imprecise ambiguity
significantly increases the premiums insurers indicated they would charge to insure against
the damage. We also found that premiums under conflict ambiguity are significantly higher
than premiums under risk (F=22.45, p=0.000 and F=16.29, p=0.000 for the 1-year and the 20year contracts respectively). These results indicate that H1 holds, i.e., insurers are indeed
averse to both types of ambiguity.
Although we computed our results using the geometric mean, we are also aware that
some insurers might have considered using the arithmetic mean of the two expert estimates

12

Specifically, 41 (51.25%) participants charged simultaneously a smaller premium under risk than under

imprecise ambiguity, and a smaller premium under risk than under conflict ambiguity. Sixteen (20%)
participants charged a higher premium under one source of ambiguity than under risk.
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In the text, we report the main effect of the Natural Hazard factor only when it was significant.
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rather than the geometric mean. We thus also computed the risk premium for each response
under risk, imprecise ambiguity and conflict ambiguity (Table 3b). In the case of risk, the
risk premium (RP) is the difference between the pure premium and the expected loss (i.e.,
$1,000). For the two types of ambiguity, we calculated the risk premium (RP) as the
difference between the pure premium and the arithmetic mean of the expected losses; that is
$1,125 ($1,000*0.5*(0.02+0.005)).
-----------------------------------------------------INSERT TABLE 3b ABOUT HERE
-----------------------------------------------------Table 3b presents the means and medians of the risk premium (RP) distributions, by
hazard and by source of uncertainty. We can see that mean risk premiums under imprecise
ambiguity and conflict ambiguity are higher than risk premiums under risk when insurers sell
the standard one-year contracts. We ran similar statistical analysis on the risk premiums
distributions (mean) as we did on the mean log premiums in Table 3a. These tests shows that
insurers charge significantly higher RP under imprecise ambiguity than under risk (F=11.388,
p=0.001 for one-year contracts; F=4.354, p=0.040 for 20-year contracts); and under conflict
ambiguity than under risk (F=12.504, p=0.001 for one-year contracts; F=2.848, p=0.048 –
one sided test – for 20-year contracts). These results confirm that insurers are ambiguity
averse, and that H1 is supported.

3.2. Conflict aversion hypothesis (H2)
To test H2 we restricted our analysis to the imprecise ambiguity and conflict
ambiguity contexts and performed a MANOVA on the log premiums with Source of
Uncertainty, Natural Hazard and Participant ID as fixed factors. Looking at all three hazards
combined, participants said they would charge premiums between 2.7 percent and 4.5 percent
higher under conflict ambiguity than under imprecise ambiguity (for the 20-year and 1-year
15

contracts, respectively; Table 3a). This suggests a tendency for conflict aversion, but this
difference was not large enough to be statistically significant (F=0.58, p=0.45 and F=0.19,
p=0.66 for 1-year and 20-year contracts respectively) so that H2 was not supported.14
We also examined whether insurers assessed the three types of hazard differently. To
do so, we ran three MANOVAs (one for each hazard), with Source of Uncertainty as a fixed
factor, and asked for simple contrasts in order to compare the premiums charged under
imprecise ambiguity with those charged under conflict ambiguity. When the data were
disaggregated, we found that, contrary to what we predicted, for the fire hazard insurers
charged smaller premiums under conflict ambiguity than under imprecise ambiguity (8.3
percent and 29.4 percent smaller for the 1-year and 20-year contracts, respectively; Table 3a).
These contrasts are significant for both the 1-year premiums (p=0.049) and the 20-year
premiums (p=0.013). For the two other hazards however, we observed the predicted trend.
Insurers charged on average more under conflict ambiguity than under imprecise ambiguity
for flood (8.5 percent and 30.4 percent higher for the 1-year and 20-year contracts,
respectively), and for hurricane (13.9 percent and 16.3 percent higher for the 1-year and 20year contracts, respectively) but none of these contrasts are statistically significant (Table 3a).

14

It is worth noting that the same pattern was obtained when the responders were asked about the level of

confidence they had in their estimates of the premium (see question 8 in appendix 1). A MANOVA on
confidence scores across all respondents revealed that insurers were much more confident in their decisions
under risk (3.55 and 3.15) than under imprecise ambiguity (3.11and 2.89) (F=11.22, p=0.001 and F=16.34, p =
0.000 for 1-year and 20-year premiums, respectively); and under risk than under conflict ambiguity (3.16 and
2.79) (F=6.55, p = 0.012; and F=9.37, p = 0.003 for 1-year and 20-year premiums, respectively). In addition,
we did not find any statistically significant difference between the confidence scores under imprecise ambiguity
and conflict ambiguity (F=0.24, p = 0.63 and F=0.07, p = 0.79 for the 1-year and 20-year premiums,
respectively).
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These results suggest that the nature of the hazard matters, even though the expected loss is
the same for each one of these three hazard scenarios.
There might be several reasons for this behavior. It might be due to the potential for
truly catastrophic losses from hurricanes and floods. Of the twenty-five most costly insured
disasters that occurred in the world between 1970 and 2010, twenty-two of them were
hurricanes and floods. Moreover, when we ran this experiment in 2008, seven major
hurricanes had made landfall in the U.S. in 2004 and 2005, including Hurricane Katrina
which inflicted over $150 billion in economic losses, $48 billion of which was borne by
private insurers (2008 prices) (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2009). In contrast, with the
exception of large-scale wild fires such as those in Russia during the summer of 2010, events
resulting in insurance losses for house fires tend to be relatively small in size.
Another explanation relates to the available data for estimating the likelihood of these
three different hazards. After the seven major hurricanes of 2004 and 2005, some risk
modeling firms and insurers revised their catastrophe models to reflect a potential increase in
climate-related risk. In contrast, insurers typically have large historical database for house
fires from their own claims and from engineering studies to improve building safety.

3.3. Insurers normally expect convergent and precise estimates from their advisors (H3)
We now turn to testing H3 which predicts that insurers expect a priori the two riskmodeling firms to provide the same precise probability (normal condition). To test this
prediction, we asked the surveyed insurers “To what extent do you have the impression that
there is there something unusual about the estimates of the probability of the damage you
have been given?” (question 2 in appendix 1). Answers were given on a 7-point scale
ranging from -3 “nothing unusual” to +3 “extremely unusual.” This scale captures the degree
of “unusualness” of the decision context. We transformed this scale into a 3-point scale
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ranging from 1 “nothing unusual” (old scores -3, -2, -1), to 2 “neutral” (old score 0), and 3
“something unusual” (old scores +1, +2, +3). Table 4 gives the frequencies of answers (and
percentage) to the unusualness question by type of hazards.
-----------------------------------------------------INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
-----------------------------------------------------We can also look at the results by type of hazards. For each hazard, we ran a series of
two-way Chi-square tests to determine whether the distribution of answers to the
“unusualness” question under risk was different from the distributions of answers under
imprecise ambiguity, and under conflict ambiguity. For fire, we found that these differences
were highly significant both for the comparison between risk and imprecise ambiguity
(Cramer’s V=0.428, p = 0.007) and for the comparison between risk and conflict ambiguity
(Cramer’s V = 0.576, p = 0.000). Specifically, Table 4 shows that under risk, a large
majority of insurers (70 percent) said that there was “nothing unusual” about the estimates of
the probability of the damage they were given, whereas only a minority of insurers exposed
to the imprecise ambiguity context (28 percent) and to the conflict ambiguity context (20
percent) considered this to be the case. In other words, insurers exposed to the fire scenario
said that they were expecting the two-risk modeling firms to come up with the same precise
probability, as H3 predicts.
For flood, we did not find any significant difference between the distributions of
answers to the unusualness question under risk and imprecision ambiguity (Cramer’s V =
0.042, p = 1), and under risk and conflict ambiguity (Cramer’s V = 0.177, p = 0.426). This
means that H3 is not supported. Yet, Table 4 shows that the distribution of the perception of
unusualness under risk and imprecise ambiguity are highly similar (52 percent, 16 percent
and 32 percent; and 50 percent, 19 percent and 31 percent, respectively). Although
perceptions of unusualness under risk and conflict ambiguity are not significantly different,
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Table 4 thus shows that we observed the expected trend. The proportion of “neutral” answers
is similar under risk and conflict ambiguity (16 percent and 21 percent, respectively) but,
under risk, a large proportion of insurers (52 percent) considered that there was “nothing
unusual” about the probability estimates they were given; whereas under conflict ambiguity, a
large proportion of insurers (45 percent) said that there was “something unusual” about the
probability estimates. Taken all together, these results suggest that insurers exposed to the
flood scenario tended to expect the two modeling firms to come up with the same precise
probability estimate (or the same imprecise probability) and did not expect them to disagree
on the probability of the damage.
For hurricane, we also found that H3 was not supported by the data. The series of 2way Chi-square tests showed that the distributions of answers to the unusualness question
under risk did not differ from the distributions of answers under imprecise ambiguity
(Cramer’s V = 0.199, p = 0.36), and under conflict ambiguity (Cramer’s V = 0.120, p = 0.72).

3.4. Conflict imprecision leads to person attribution whereas imprecise ambiguity leads to
task attribution (H4)
Finally, we test the H4 predictions. The abnormal conditions focus model of causal
attribution (Hilton and Slugoski 1986) contends that due to low consensus (disagreement
between advisors), insurers will attribute conflict ambiguity to the incompetence of their
advisors and perceive their advisors to be less credible and trustworthy than in cases of high
consensus where the advisors agree. On the other hand, the same causal attribution model
contends that when expert advisors provide similar but imprecise estimates of the probability
of an event, insurers will attribute the imprecise ambiguity to the difficulty of the task.
Based on this causal attribution model, we made the following two predictions (H4).
First, we predicted that under the conflict ambiguity case, the insurers will attribute the

19

uncertainty they face to the incompetence of (at least one of) their advisors compared to the
standard risk case. Second, we predicted that in the case of imprecise ambiguity, compared to
the standard risk case, insurers will be more likely to attribute the uncertainty they face to the
difficulty of the task.
First, to test whether conflict ambiguity generates doubt about the advisors’
competence compared to risk, we focused on the comparison between the two. For each
hazard, we run a series of two-way Chi-square tests, one for each of the two person
attribution questions (questions 3 and 4 in appendix 1) and one for the competence question
(question 6 in appendix 1). Table 5 shows that for all three hazards, as hypothesized, the
proportion of insurers considering their advisors to be “competent” was consistently higher in
the risk context than in the conflict ambiguity context, as evidenced by the percentages that
are systematically higher under risk – 100 percent, 88 percent and 66 percent – than under
conflict ambiguity –76 percent, 69 percent, 60 percent (scores are given for flood, hurricane
and fire, respectively). A statistical test showed that the distribution of answers to the
competence question under risk was significantly different from the distribution of answers
under conflict ambiguity across the three hazards (Cramer’s V = 0.190, p =0.025; one-sided
test) This effect, however, was mainly due to results from the fire scenario where the
difference is significant (Cramer’s V = 0.504, p = 0.000) whereas the effect is not significant
for flood (Cramer’s V = 0.178, p = 0.58) and hurricane (Cramer’s V = 0.051, p = 1)
scenarios.
-----------------------------------------------------INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
------------------------------------------------------

We then looked at the Positive Source attribution question. As predicted, across
hazards, insurers were more likely to agree with the statement that their advisors “did their
work very well” (Positive Source) under risk than under conflict ambiguity (Cramer’s V =
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0.222, p = 0.022). This global effect was significant mainly because of the fire scenario,
where we found that the distribution of answers to the positive source question under risk was
significantly different from the distribution of answers under conflict ambiguity (Cramer’s V
= 0.511, p = 0.001). Thus, in the fire scenario, Table 5 shows for instance that more insurers
agreed with the positive source statement under risk (57.7 percent) than under conflict
ambiguity (20 percent). Conversely, more insurers disagree with the statement under conflict
ambiguity (52 percent) than under risk (7.7 percent). In the flood and hurricane scenarios,
however, even though a larger number of insurers disagreed with the positive statement under
conflict ambiguity than under risk (17.2 percent versus 8 percent for flood; 31 percent versus
24 percent for hurricane), a large proportion of insurers opted for the “neutral” answer under
both conflict ambiguity and risk. Statistical tests confirmed that the distributions of answers
to the positive source question under risk and under conflict ambiguity were not statistically
different (Cramer’s V = 0.175, p = 0.437; Cramer’s V = 0.102, p = 0.786 for flood and
hurricane respectively).
When looking at the Negative Source question, across hazards, we found no
significant difference between the distributions of answers under risk and conflict ambiguity
(Cramer’s V = 0.166, p = 0.115). This aggregated result, however, hides the fact that in the
fire scenario, the difference was significant, and was in the predicted direction (Cramer’s V =
0.434, p = 0.007). For instance, Table 5 shows that in the fire scenario, more insurers agreed
with the statement that “at least one firm did not do its work well” under conflict ambiguity
(44 percent) than under risk (15 percent). In the flood scenario, although Table 5 shows that
the distributions of answers exhibit the predicted pattern – more agreement under conflict
ambiguity (17 percent) than under risk (4 percent), and more disagreement under risk (48
percent) than under conflict ambiguity (31 percent) – the effect was not significant (Cramer’s
V = 0.242, p = 0.244). This might be due to the fact that in this case, a large proportion of
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insurers were actually “neutral” under both conflict ambiguity (52 percent) and risk (48
percent). In the hurricane scenario, we found no significant difference between the
distributions of answers to the negative source attribution question under conflict ambiguity
and risk (Cramer’s V = 0.243, p = 0.205).
We then tested for the second part of H4, which predicts that insurers will be more
likely to attribute the uncertainty they face to the difficulty of the task under imprecise
ambiguity than under risk. To do so, we compared the distributions of answers to the task
attribution question under imprecise ambiguity and risk. As predicted, across hazards, we
found that the two distributions of answers were different (Cramer’s V = 0.417, p = 0.000).
Table 5 shows indeed that more insurers agreed with the statement “estimating the
probability is a highly difficult task” under imprecise ambiguity (69 percent, 85 percent, 92
percent for fire, flood and hurricane, respectively) than under risk (38 percent, 8 percent, 83
percent for fire, flood and hurricane, respectively). The difference between the two
distributions was significant for fire (Cramer’s V = 0.346, p = 0.041) and for flood (Cramer’s
V = 0.836, p = 0.000), but not for hurricane (Cramer’s V = 0.140, p = 0.707).
In sum, both predictions of H4 were supported for the fire scenario, but not for the
flood and hurricane scenarios. This raises questions about expert insurers’ differing
expectations concerning these scenarios, which we discuss below.

4. Summary and Conclusion
Our results provide additional evidence that sophisticated subjects – insurers are
experts in decision-making under uncertainty – behave as if they are ambiguity-averse in the
loss domain when faced with the task of pricing risks having a low probability of occurrence
but potentially catastrophic effects (H1).
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Furthermore, our results show that the source of ambiguity can have an important
impact on choices. When all hazards are combined, our prediction that insurance
professionals would be more concerned with conflict ambiguity than imprecise ambiguity was
not confirmed (H2). But when the data were disaggregated, we found that on average,
insurers tended to charge higher premiums under conflict ambiguity than under imprecise
ambiguity for hazards perceived as potentially catastrophic such as floods and hurricanes, but
lower premiums for non-catastrophic hazards such as house fires.
We then asked whether this tendency for aversion to conflict came from a cognitive
heuristic that leads individuals to attribute the cause of conflicting uncertainty to the
incompetence of their advisors. If they doubted the quality of their advisors’ estimates, they
might want to increase the price of coverage by assigning a larger weight to the highest
probability estimate from the two advisors. To answer this question, we used attribution
theory (Hilton and Slugoski 1986; Hilton et al. 1995). We reasoned that insurers would
normally expect risk-modeling firms to be in agreement and to communicate a precise
probability (H3).
We found that the risky context was perceived as the most usual context for fire,
whereas conflict ambiguity was rated as the most unusual context. For hurricane, imprecise
ambiguity was rated the most usual context, and risk the most unusual. We believe this is due
to the nature of hurricane assessment which requires one to use climate models to project
losses in the future. The choice of different climate models and slightly different
assumptions or other elements of the selected model will generate different outcomes. We
assumed that insurers will expect consensual and precise probability forecasts from their
advisors. We thus predicted that disagreeing advisors will be considered as less credible and
competent than advisors converging on the same precise estimate. We also predicted that
imprecise but consensual advisors will not be considered as less credible and competent than
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advisors converging on the same precise estimate, and that imprecise ambiguity will be
attributed to the difficulty of the judgmental (H4). In the fire scenario in particular, we found
that insurers indeed perceived the risk modeling firms that provided the estimates as being
less competent under conflicting uncertainty than under risk; and that they were more likely
to attribute the uncertainty they face to the difficulty of the task under imprecise ambiguity
than under risk.
Our data also suggest that expert insurers have strong a priori expectations associated
with different kinds of hazards which influence their judgments. Indeed, their responses differ
between a hazard where there is a potential catastrophe (flood and hurricane) and the more
standard case where the losses are non-catastrophic (fire) where the expected loss is the same
for each hazard. These systematic differences suggest that future research should address the
correspondence between risk and ambiguity domains, availability of actuarial estimates, and
insurers’ expectations about risk modelers’ predictions. For example, the expectation that
experts should converge to precise point estimates may hold only in cases where there is
enough relevant actuarial data. If we assume that the experienced insurers in our sample
know that such actuarial data exists for fire but not for flood and hurricane, this could explain
why consensus over precise estimates would be seen as a cue to competence only for the fire
hazard.
In future research it would also be useful to test whether individuals consider that they
are less informed when their advisors exhibit conflict ambiguity than imprecise ambiguity. In
other words, one could test whether individuals would treat conflict ambiguity as a form of
“epistemic uncertainty” due to lack of knowledge that could be reduced and imprecise
ambiguity as “aleatory uncertainty” due to randomness. In the former case, individuals
would be better informed if they rely on more competent advisors, whereas in the latter case
they could not reduce the uncertainty by simply requesting the estimates of more advisors.
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TABLES
Table 1. Differences between Risk, Imprecise Ambiguity and Conflict Ambiguity
Risk

Imprecise Ambiguity

Conflict Ambiguity

Advisor A1

½

[1/4;3/4]

¼

Advisor A2

½

[1/4;3/4]

¾

Table 2. Scenarios: The Three Sources of Uncertainty
Source of Uncertainty
Risk
The probability of the risk
is well established. There is
a consensus on a precise
probability.
Imprecise ambiguity
There is uncertainty about
the probability of the risk
but there is no controversy.

Conflict ambiguity
There is controversy about
the probability of the risk.

Implementation
You have asked two modeling firms with whom you usually work to
evaluate the annual probability of a flood severely damaging a home in
the area. Both modeling firms estimate that there is 1 in 100 chance
that a flood will severely damage homes in this area this year (i.e., the
annual probability is 1%). They both are confident in their estimate.
You have asked two modeling firms with whom you usually work to
evaluate the annual probability of a hurricane severely damaging a
home in the area. Both modeling firms recognize it is difficult to
provide you with a precise probability estimate. The two modeling
firms however agree that the probability that a hurricane will severely
damage homes in this area this year ranges somewhere between 1 in
200 chance and 1 in 50 chance (i.e., they have converged to the same
0.5% to 2% probability range).
You have asked two modeling firms with whom you usually work to
evaluate the annual probability of a fire severely damaging a home in
the area. There is a strong disagreement between the two modeling
firms. One modeling firm confidently estimates that there is 1 in 200
chance that a fire will severely damage homes in this area this year
(i.e., the annual probability is 0.5%). The other modeling firm
confidently estimates that the chance that a fire will severely damage
homes in this area this year is much higher: 1 in 50 chance (i.e., the
annual probability is 2%).
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Table 3a. Geometric Mean and Median Pure Premiums in $/Year
1-year contract
Imprecise
Conflict
Risk
Ambiguity Ambiguity

20-year contract
Imprecise
Conflict
Risk
Ambiguity Ambiguity

Fire
Geometric Mean

1,137

1,614

1,479

1,076

1,780

1,256

Median

1,000

1,500

1,500

1,000

1,500

1,250

Flood
Geometric Mean

1,342

1,620

1,758

1,282

1,450

1,891

Median

1,100

1,500

2,000

1,000

1,600

1,600

Hurricane
Geometric Mean

1,369

1,549

1,765

1,583

1,510

1,756

Median

1,100

1,250

1,925

1,025

1,500

2,000

Total (n=80)
Geometric Mean

1,281

1,596

1,668

1,307

1,582

1,624

Median

1,000

1,500

1,925

1,000

1,500

1,650

Table 3b. Mean and Median Risk Premiums in $/Year
1-year contract
Imprecise
Conflict
Risk
Ambiguity Ambiguity

20-year contract
Imprecise
Conflict
Risk
Ambiguity Ambiguity

Fire
Mean
Median

672
0

816
375

652
375

320
0

1988
375

464
125

Mean
Median

654
100

1143
375

959
875

895
0

860
475

2069
475

Mean
Median
Total (n=80)
Mean
Median

578
100

1007
125

1219
800

1277
25

1089
375

1082
875

632
0

982
375

948
800

847
0

1341
375

1247
525

Flood

Hurricane

Table 4. Distribution of Answers (%) to the Unusualness Question
Fire
Nothing unusual
Neutral
Something unusual
Flood
Nothing unusual
Neutral
Something unusual
Hurricane
Nothing unusual
Neutral
Something unusual

Risk

Imprecision

Conflict

18 (70)
4 (15)
4 (15)

8 (28)
7 (24)
14 (48)

5 (20)
2 (08)
18 (72)

13 (52)
4 (16)
8 (32)

13 (50)
5 (19)
8 (31)

10 (34)
6 (21)
13 (45)

10 (34)
4 (14)
15 (52)

12 (48)
5 (20)
8 (32)

8 (31)
6 (23)
12 (46)
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Table 5. Distribution of Answers (%) to the Competence Question and Attribution Questions(a)
Flood
Hurricane
Fire
Risk
Imprecis. Conflict Risk
Imprecis. Conflict Risk
Imprecis. Conflict
Competence: Impression that the two modeling firms are competent in…
Not competent
0 (0)
2 (7)
1 (04) 2 (08)
0 (0)
3 (10)
3 (10)
2 (8)
2 (8)
Neutral
0 (0)
4 (14)
9 (36) 1 (04)
4 (15)
4 (14)
7 (24)
3 (12)
6 (23)
22
Competent
26 (100)
23 (79) 15 (60)
(88)
22 (85) 22 (76)
19 (66)
20 (80)
18 (69)
Positive Source : Both modeling firms did their work very well
Do not agree
2 (7.7)
4 (14) 13 (52) 2 (08)
5 (19) 5 (17.2)
7 (24)
5 (20)
8 (31)
16
14
Neutral
9 (34.6)
14 (48)
7 (28)
(64)
6 (23)
(48.3)
14 (48)
9 (36)
10 (38)
10
Agree
15 (57.7)
11 (38)
5 (20) 7 (28)
15 (58)
(34.5)
8 (28)
11 (44)
8 (31)
Negative Source: At least one modeling firm did not do its work very well
12
Do not agree
16 (62)
10 (34)
5 (20)
(48)
13 (50)
9 (31)
8 (27.6)
12 (48)
13 (50)
12
Neutral
6 (23)
14 (48)
9 (36)
(48)
7 (27) 15 (52) 15 (51.7)
7 (28)
8 (31)
Agree
4 (15)
5 (17) 11 (44) 1 (04)
6 (23)
5 (17)
6 (20.7)
6 (24)
5 (19)
Task: Estimating the probability of (…) is a highly difficult task
19
Do not agree
14 (54)
6 (21)
6 (24)
(76)
0 (0)
0
3 (10)
1 (4)
3 (11.5)
Neutral
2 (08)
3 (10)
2 (08) 4 (16)
4 (15)
0
2 (07)
1 (4)
2 (7.7)
Agree
10 (38)
20 (69) 17 (68) 2 (08)
22 (85) 29 (100)
24 (83)
23 (92)
21 80.8)
(a) As for the unusualness question, answers which were given on a 7-point scale ranging from -3 (strongly disagree) to +3 (strongly agree). We
then transformed into 3-point scale ranging from 1 “do not agree” (old scores -3, -2, -1), to 2 “neutral” (old score 0), and 3 “agree” (old scores
+1, +2, +3).

FIGURE
Figure 1. Graphical Representation of Experts’ Judgments in the Experiment
Risk
0%

1%

100%
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APPENDIX 1: EXPERIMENT QUESTIONS
For each scenario, the participants were asked to answer 10 questions, presented in the
following order:
1. Perception of disagreement. We asked participants to answer the question “To what
extent do you have the impression that the two modeling firms are in agreement on the
estimate of the probability of the damage?” on a 7-point scale, ranging from -3 = “Not in
agreement at all” to +3 = “In complete agreement.”
2. Degree of “unusualness”. We asked participants to rate on a 7-point scale, ranging from
-3 = “Nothing unusual at all” to +3 = “Extremely unusual” the degree of “unusualness”
of the scenario. The question was: “To what extent do you have the impression that
there is there something unusual about the estimates of the probability of the damage
you have been given?”
3. Positive person attribution. We asked participants: “How strongly do you agree with the
following statement? “Both modeling firms did their work, i.e., estimating the probability
of the [flood/fire/hurricane] damage in this case, very well.” Participants could answer
this question on a 7-point scale ranging from -3 = “Strongly disagree” to +3 = “Strongly
agree.”
4. Negative person attribution. We asked participants: “How strongly do you agree with
the following statement? “At least one of the two modeling firms did not do its work, i.e.,
estimating the probability of the [flood/fire/hurricane] damage in this case, very well.”
We used the same scale as for question 3.
5. External (Task) attribution. We asked participants: “How strongly do you agree with the
following statement?: “Estimating the probability of the [flood/fire/hurricane] damage
in this case is a highly difficult task.” We used the same scale as for question 3.
6. Perception of the competence of the advisors. The participants were asked to answer the
question “To what extent do you have the impression that the two modeling firms are
both competent in estimating the probability of the [flood/fire/hurricane] damage in this
case?” on a 7-point scale, ranging from -3 = “Both firms are not competent at all”; 0 =
“At least one firm is not competent”; +3 = “Both firms are extremely competent.”
7. Pricing (1-year contract). Participants were told that they had the possibility of offering a
typical one-year contract. We asked them to report the “minimum annual premium
(excluding administrative costs) that they would charge against the risk.”
8. Confidence (1-year contract). Participants were asked to rate on a 7-point scale ranging
from 1 = “Not at all confident” to 7 = “Extremely confident” they degree of confidence
in their estimate of the premium.
9. Pricing (20-year contract). Participants were asked to give “the minimum annual
premium (excluding administrative costs)” that they would like to charge against the risk
in a case where they could offer a “20-year insurance contract against the damage to the
property that would be tied to the homeowner mortgage.”
10. Confidence (20-year contract). Participants were asked to give “the minimum annual
premium (excluding administrative costs)” that they would like to charge against the risk
in the 20-year contract case.

APPENDIX 2: INFORMATION ABOUT THE PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR
COMPANY
This appendix provides descriptive statistics on our random sample of 80 U.S. insurers. We
had 52 answers from actuaries (65%), 3 answers from underwriters (3.75%), 7 answers from
risk managers (8.75%), 5 answers from general managers (15%), and 13 answers (16.25%)
from other jobs (product management, pricing management, analysts…). With regard to past
experience, 33.75% of our sample had less than 2 years of experience in their job, 44% had
between 2 and 5 years of experience in their job, 13% had between 6 and 11 years of
experience in their job, and 8.75% had more than 12 years of experience in their job. Three
(3) participants had a PhD (3.75%), and 2 participants (2.5%) had a high school degree as
their highest degree. 80% of the participants (n=64) had a Bachelor’s degree as their highest
degree, and 13.75% had a Master’s degree (n=11).

Graph 1: Descriptive statistics – Random Sample of 80 U.S. insurers
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On average, a majority of participants (56.25%) were working for a publicly-traded
company and only 5 participants were working in a private company (see Graph 2). Among
the remaining participants, 33.75% of the participants were working for a mutual, and 5%
(n=4) did not know the type of company they were working for. We had a majority of
answers (51.25%) from large companies with a surplus between $5 and $10B; 25% of
participants worked for a company having a surplus larger than $10B. Two percent of the
participants worked for a company having a surplus between $1 and $5B. Five percent of the
participants did not answer the question. In terms of number of employees, 68.5% of the
participants reported working for a company having between 5,000 and 20,000 employees,
5% were in companies with more than 20,000 employees, and 12.5% were in companies
having between 1,000 and 5,000 employees (11.25% did not provide the number of
employees of their company).

Graph 2: Characteristics of the companies
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